A Comprehensive Look at the Siege of Delhi | EXCERPT

On 10 May 1857, the most serious threat to British supremacy in India appeared at Meerut. With the mutiny spreading rapidly, it became imperative for the British to recapture Delhi as the success or failure of the uprising hinged entirely on the possession of the city. It would take three months of bloody fighting for the British Delhi Field Force to defeat the rebel sepoys and recapture the city, a period in which it became unclear quite who besieged whom.

Historian Amarpal Singh’s The Siege of Delhi transports readers back to these turbulent times. Read an excerpt:

As August wore on, rebel efforts to cannonade the British position were increasingly hampered by dwindling supplies of gunpowder. Zafar had been warned as early as 20 June that the gunpowder in the Delhi magazine was all but gone. Local manufacture had filled the gap, but the gunners were expending so much on a daily basis that the powder makers in the city could not keep up with demand. Zafar therefore asked Mirza Mughal to arrange for groups to search the city for gunpowder barrels, presumably looking for those looted from the magazine on 11 May. He also asked the prince to urgently pursue the purchase of more materials for increased production. Some regiments still had the stocks of gunpowder they had brought with them, but they proved reluctant to share.

According to Mirza Khizr Sultan, the 74th NI at the Lahore Gate were sitting on a healthy 232 barrels; meanwhile, the guns at the Kashmir Gate, which were using up the most powder, only had seventy barrels left. By 27 June, sufficient saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder had been obtained and large vessels were sited in the godowns of the city for its refinement. One of the main areas for production was just behind the Jama Masjid. ‘Immense preparations are being made for the manufacture of gunpowder under the superintendence of Mirza Mogul,’ Barnes reported to Lawrence on 5 July. Spies estimated the production rate to be somewhere from 6 to 15 maunds (roughly 200–600 kilograms) every day, depending on supply levels and the weather. Over six rainy days at the end of July, the rebels produced just 20 maunds.

With the authorities failing to organise the equitable distribution of gunpowder, Rajab Ali reported that the shortage triggered a rush to stockpile: ‘The 74th and 54th have a private stock of 500 maunds of powder, which they will not give up. They say they know their lives are forfeited, as they raised the rebellion. They keep this powder for emergencies. There are about 400 maunds cutcha of saltpetre, but no sulphur, in Delhee.’

On the afternoon of 7 August, a large explosion rocked the city after a makeshift magazine in the city caught fire. The entire building was destroyed, with many casualties. Zahir Dehlvi reckoned as many as 700 men were killed in the explosion. From his house he could see a huge column of smoke and dust climbing into the sky. At the scene, a huge crowd converged to dig out dead relatives. Nearby houses caught fire.

Desperate people clawed at the rubble all night. On top of the fatalities, a further 100 people were estimated to have been wounded. The death toll could well have been worse had the building contained more than a humble 20 maunds of powder; so acute was the shortage of gunpowder in the city that it was taken away as quickly as it was produced, meaning the magazines were usually almost empty. The explosion was quickly noticed on the ridge, and the British troops reacted with jubilation, as Greathed describes:

As we were returning along the ridge towards the Flagstaff my attention was directed towards the city and I saw a magnificent column of white smoke arise. It shot straight into the air and then assumed the shape of a mighty mushroom and slowly floated on. It ignited by accident and carried with it into the air some 500 artificers employed in the manufactory and the stock of sulphur and saltpetre. There was of course great cheering from the batteries though we could not claim the credit of the explosion.

There would be recriminations. In their anger, the sepoys would turn on Zafar’s physician, Ahsan Ulla Khan. Claiming to have unearthed a letter written by him to the British camp, they set fire to his house. Barnes reported that Ahsan Ulla Khan was forced to stay in the fort for his own protection, with only the King’s influence protecting him:

The soldiery demanded his surrender and even menaced the King’s life, and those of his family, if their wishes were not complied with. At last the King gave up the Hakeem into their hands, but said that if his life was injured he would not survive his servant. For this purpose the King always carries about his person a small diamond. [It was the belief in those days that swallowing a diamond would mean death.] Zeenut Muhul is also an object of strong suspicion.

As the days went by, others were suspected of complicity. The man in charge of the elephant stud was also suspected of having a hand in the destruction of the magazine, seemingly because he happened to live nearby. The destroyed magazine had been in the south of the city, safely away from the range of British guns. However, spies now began reporting the manufacture of powder at a property in the north of the city. If the British guns could be brought closer to the walls, they said, the new manufactory would be in range.

By 12 August, Rajab Ali was reporting serious issues with the quality of the powder that was being produced. ‘A gun cartridge was taken out of the ammunition wagon seized along with the four guns on the 12th and opened in camp,’ he reported. ‘It was filled with new powder, very coarse and of inferior quality. This fact confirms the reports that they have no good powder left, but are obliged to make their daily supply. Shortly brimstone [sulphur] will run short, and then they will not be able to make even this powder, bad as it is.’ Another spy reported this issue on the same day: ‘Some good gunpowder for small arms has been obtained from the merchants in the city. But the powder for the guns is very poor. Ahmad Mirza Khan has supplied 500 maunds of good saltpeter.’ The latter spy also reported that the rebels were forced to cast their own musket barrels, cartridges and cannon balls, with predictable results.

The acquisition of sulphur continued to prove problematic as the weeks wore on. Extensive searches continued within the city. Toorab Ali reported on 14 August that sulphur was being seized from shops, with 35 maunds being taken from one shop alone. On 16 August, no powder was manufactured due to the dearth of sulphur. Finally, the Delhi regiments were successfully cajoled into sharing 150 maunds they had appropriated from the British magazine in May.

By 20 August, reports were emerging that charcoal, equally essential in the manufacture of gunpowder, was being made from bamboo instead of hardwood. A week later, spies related that 50 maunds of gunpowder were being produced daily; the guns were using at least this much each day. By the beginning of September, the issue of the shortage of sulphur was once again acute. It was thought that supplies could be obtained from Rewaree, and moves were made to arrange this. ‘The day before yesterday 27 barrels of gun-powder newly manufactured were carried off to the palace, and about 60 maunds in an incomplete state are lying in the manufactory,’ wrote Barnes on 1 September. ‘No more sulphur is to be had at any price. On account of the badness of the powder recently made, some fire-work makers of Coel were sent for to Delhee, but they have not come.’ The next day, the production of gunpowder was halted completely. All supplies of sulphur in the city had been depleted.