Forgotten Kashmir: What Happens on the Other Side of the Line of Control? | EXCERPT

Forgotten Kashmir is not simply a historical account but one that analyses the events in POK against the background of developments in Pakistan’s polity to better understand Pakistan’s motivations for its policies in the region. The author, a seasoned diplomat, provides a wealth of information that comes from his various experiences in the government. Read an excerpt:

Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ‘Naya Pakistan’

Prime Minister Imran Khan did not respond for five days after the Pulwama attack on 14 February 2019. When he did speak on 19 February, it was to hold out the threat of retaliation should India take any action. The statement contained no condemnation of the act of terrorism. He offered to investigate if India provided evidence. This was after the JeM had already claimed responsibility for the attack.

There was a suicide attack in the Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran on the same day as the Pulwama incident. The modality was identical—a suicide attacker in a jeep rammed a bus carrying Iranian troops, twenty-seven of whom died. The Iranian authorities stated that the attacker was a Pakistani national. Whether the two attacks on the same day in Jammu and Kashmir and Iran were a coincidence, is difficult to say. The common element was that in both incidents, the attacks originated in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s permissive environment has bred extremism. The prime minister’s failure to make even a token condemnation of the Pulwama attack could only have encouraged such elements.

During his visit to New York in September 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan addressed the Council on Foreign Relations. In reply to a question by Richard Haas, he said, ‘Pakistan, by joining the U.S. after 9/11, committed one of the biggest blunders.’33 He said that the Pakistan government should not have pledged what they could not deliver. He added, ‘The groups that were close to the Pakistan army, the army was now trying to kill them.’34

This was an admission of the proximity of terror groups to the Pakistan army in the past. It also implied that the Pakistani state could not control such groups. What followed was an even more interesting revelation:

The Pakistani Army, ISI, trained Al Quaeda, and all these troops to fight in Afghanistan. There were always links between – there had to be links because they trained them. Now, as I said, after 9/11, when we did a 180-degree turn and when after those groups, you know, not everyone agreed with us. Within the army, people didn’t agree with us. And so, as I said, there were more insider attacks in Pakistan. General Musharraf, there were two attacks on him – suicide attacks on him – which were insider from within the army.

Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statement, cited above, is an extraordinary admission of the Pakistan army’s links with Al Qaeda and other terror groups. He also admitted the problem within the army. The radicalization within its ranks triggered an insider attack on the army chief’s life, and on military establishments. This challenges the assumption, which was always tenuous at best, that the army was the bulwark against the spread of Islamization.

While Prime Minister Imran Khan admitted the problem, he is in no position to do anything about it. The political leadership under him is dependent upon the army and religious parties like Tehreek-e-Labbaik-e-Pakistan (TLP). His government has a six-member majority in the Pakistan National Assembly. Like most Pakistani politicians, he has discovered the use of the ‘Kashmir cause’ in shoring up popular support for his government. This is combined with a carefully cultivated streak of enlightened moderation when addressing the Western audience.

The violence which erupted in the Valley in the late 1980s was blamed on alleged irregularities in the 1987 elections. Elections had not been held in PoK for eight years (1977 to 1985). The elections of 1985 were boycotted by the PPP and lacked credibility in the absence of a strong opposition. The absence of democracy or autonomy in PoK did not lead to violence. What accounts for the difference in the situation on the two sides of the LoC is the conscious policy of the Pakistani State to sponsor terrorism and extremism in search of its strategic goals. Jihadi groups engaged in terrorism have little interest in promoting democracy, which is considered a Western value.

The history of PoK began with ‘tribal invasion’ in 1947. Pakistan continued with this policy of covert warfare against the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965 and during the Kargil war. The extremist philosophy was reflected in the destruction of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1995, which was a symbol of Kashmir’s Sufi tradition and pluralism. There is no sign yet of a change in the Pakistan army’s policy of using jihadi assets to advance the ‘Kashmir cause’. PoK is only a pawn in this game.