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Saare Jahaan Se Acha: Making India Great | EXTRACT

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13.08.2020

In the days following up to Independence Day (and with a lot more time on our hands), a lot of us may be pondering the nation and where it stands today. In her new book, Aparna Pande examines the challenges we face in the areas of social, economic, military and foreign policy and strategy. She points to the dichotomy that lies at the heart of the nation: our belief in becoming a global power and the reluctance to implement policies and take actions that would help us achieve that goal. The New India holds all the promise of greatness many of its citizens dream of. Can it become a reality? The book delves into this question. So read this excerpt from Making India Great to understand what shifts in attitude we need to realize this dream…

 

The Modi administration seems to recognize the need to modernize India’s planning architecture. In 2018, the administration formed a Defence Planning Committee and increased funding towards the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which helps the Prime Minister’s Office make decisions on strategic doctrine. As part of these reforms, the NSCS added three deputy national security advisers and one military adviser to advise the NSA.34 Such reforms are the product of the current administration’s understanding that India lacks a ‘comprehensive view on national security’.

In a crucial step for developing new grand strategy, the NSCS is now able to issue policy recommendations, and oversees planning on intelligence, science and technology, in addition to their historic oversight over internal and external defence. This comes in tandem with the formation of the external affairs ministry’s Centre for Contemporary China Studies, a research group dedicated for studying the challenges and opportunities posed to India by China. Importantly, this institution reflects the growing understanding that the rise of China will play a crucial role in the development of any future Indian foreign policy doctrine.

Bureaucratic reform is a crucial prerequisite for strategic modernization. Institution building is less glamorous than flashy new schemes and projects, but without strong foundations, it is impossible to create a lasting direction for grand strategy. Foreign aid, military logistics, diplomacy and negotiations, not to mention all of the domestic economic programmes which might service a potential new strategic doctrine, all require a massive coordinated effort. When the US began its post-Second World War strategic doctrine of global engagement, it spawned a massive expansion in the Washington bureaucracy. Today, China has poured billions into its state apparatus in order to facilitate its global ambitions. India needs to match these efforts if it intends on generating a clear, actionable strategic doctrine for itself.

India’s rising middle class expects continued economic growth, as well as an expanded role for Indian responsibility in the Indo-Pacific as its civilizational neighbourhood. To be legitimate, a new strategic doctrine must expand the country’s interests to include regional partnerships, leadership and robust economic development. Fortunately, a strategy which emphasizes integration could achieve all of these aims.

Partnerships with Japan have brought millions of dollars of investment into India, and have given New Delhi a partner to augment its influence in the region. Indo-Japanese joint ventures have been met with success in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India stands to gain considerably from these projects – South Asia’s volume of intra-regional trade, less than US $28 billion, is the lowest of anywhere in the world, one-fifth that of neighbouring Southeast Asia.

India ought to prioritize building regional infrastructure and promoting integration with fellow South Asian nations and nearby heavyweights, such as Japan and Australia. Such a move would satisfy the need for economic growth and leadership which undergirds the legitimacy of Indian grand strategy.

A strategic doctrine that promotes regional engagement would address a number of India’s growing security concerns. The geopolitical climate which made non-alignment workable has been replaced by a rising China and more interconnected world.

Regional engagement will curb Chinese influence and aggression in two ways. First, India-led economic schemes would give an alternative to predatory Chinese investment. Such a programme would prevent Beijing from coercing its clients by leveraging their economic relationships for strategic concession. Second, by establishing a more integrated South Asia and expanding its regional leadership, India will be better positioned to diplomatically oppose China’s rise.

Beijing currently attempts to accentuate differences between India and its neighbours, using economic and political incentives to support anti-Indian interests. By creating a unified front of institutions and linking its interests to those of its neighbours through trade and security cooperation, India will be in a better position to interdict Chinese efforts at dividing South Asia. The country would benefit from supporting regional development and initiatives such as the Japanese ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy, which emphasizes maritime security cooperation between Indo-Pacific interests.

Indians must also remember that domestic stability is a prerequisite for a coherent foreign policy. A country whose internal affairs are not in order will be unable to chart a straight course for their strategic doctrine. Domestic policy affects foreign relations, whether one likes it or not, and it is not enough to say that the currently contentious issues are India’s internal matters. Illiberal majoritarianism, vigilante attacks, campus protests and news stories about repression of minorities hardly paint a picture of a rising global power. A social agenda that projects the majority’s religious and cultural identity as the basis of Indian nationalism seems incompatible with its global economic and strategic aspirations.

As historian Ramachandra Guha noted correctly, ‘Because of its size and diversity, because of the continuing poverty of many of its citizens, because it is (in historical terms) still a relatively young nation state, and because it remains the most recklessly ambitious experiment in history, the Republic of India was never going to have anything but a rocky ride. National unity and democratic consolidation were always going to be more difficult to achieve than in smaller, richer, more homogeneous and older countries.’

It is important to remember that aspirations must always be matched with capabilities. Wishful thinking about development and influence must be tempered with an understanding of India’s ability to achieve its aims. Unilateralism and deep global commitments are simply not possible while the country has a long list of domestic concerns to deal with, and while GDP remains under one-eighth of China’s.

British scholar Martin Wight defined a dominant power as one ‘that can confidently contemplate war against any likely combination of other powers, so a great power is a power that can confidently contemplate war against any other existing single power.’ American international relations professor Robert Gilpin noted, ‘Both individually and in interaction with one another, those states that historically have been called the great powers and are known today as the superpowers establish and enforce the basic rules and rights that influence their own behavior and that of the lesser states in the system.’ By those standards, India may have the potential, but has yet to make it to the ranks of greatness as a world power.

On the one hand, India’s pride and its view of self come from its traditions and history. On the other, it being tradition-bound holds it back from achieving global power status in the twenty-first century. Ancient India was isolationist, which modern India cannot afford to be. Ancient India was other-worldly, but modern India needs to succeed and exercise power in this world. Only that would make India great in the eyes of the world.

 

For a more nuanced understanding of how we can truly make India great, order your copy of Making India Great today!

Making India Great
About the Book - Making India Great

India will be the world's most populous country by 2024 and its third largest economy by 2028. But the size of our population and a sense of historical greatness alone are insufficient to guarantee we will fulfil our ambition to…

About the Author - Aparna Pande

Dr Aparna Pande is director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. she received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in History from University of Delhi and an M. Phil from Jawaharlal…

To read more, order your copy of Making India Great, by Aparna Pande today!

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